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PRIVACY, VULNERABILITY, AND AFFORDANCE
Ryan Calo*
I. INTRODUCTION
A person without privacy is vulnerable.  But what is it to be vulner-
able?  And what role does privacy or privacy law play in vulnerability?
This Article, prepared in connection with the 22nd Annual Clifford
Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy at the DePaul University
College of Law, begins to unpack the complex, sometimes contradic-
tory relationship between privacy and vulnerability.  I begin by ex-
ploring how the law conceives of vulnerability—essentially, as a
binary status meriting special consideration where present.  Recent
literature recognizes vulnerability not as a status but as a state—a dy-
namic and manipulable condition that everyone experiences to differ-
ent degrees and at different times.
I then discuss various ways in which vulnerability and privacy inter-
sect.  I introduce an analytic distinction between vulnerability render-
ing (i.e., making a person more vulnerable) and the exploitation of
vulnerability, whether manufactured or native.  I also describe the re-
lationship between privacy and vulnerability as a vicious or virtuous
circle.  The more vulnerable a person is, the less privacy they tend to
enjoy; meanwhile, a lack of privacy opens the door to greater vulnera-
bility and exploitation.
Privacy can protect against vulnerability, but it also can be invoked
to engender it.  I describe how privacy supports the creation and ex-
ploitation of vulnerability in literal, rhetorical, and conceptual ways.
An abuser may literally use privacy to hide his abuse from law en-
forcement.  A legislature or group may rhetorically invoke privacy to
justify discrimination, for instance, against transgender individuals
who wish to use the bathroom consistent with their gender identity,1
and courts conceptually obscure vulnerability when they decide a case
* Assistant Professor, School of Law, Assistant Professor (by courtesy), Information School,
University of Washington.  The author would like to thank Stephan Landsman, Evan Selinger,
Scott Skinner Thompson, the participants in the 22nd Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law
and Social Policy, and the DePaul Law Review for helpful comments and edits.
1. These laws simultaneously compromise the privacy of transgender individuals.  For an anal-
ysis, see generally Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159 (2015).
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on the basis of privacy instead of the value that is more centrally at
stake.
Finally, building on previous work, I offer James Gibson’s theory of
affordances as a theoretical lens by which to analyze the complex rela-
tionship that privacy mediates.  Privacy, when understood as an af-
fordance, permits a more nuanced understanding of privacy and
vulnerability and could perhaps lead to wiser privacy law and policy.
II. VULNERABILITY
Vulnerability refers to exposure to emotional, physical, or other
negative forces.  We can even imagine being vulnerable to a positive
force: A person could be vulnerable to a plea for help.  This, however,
seems to stretch the meaning of vulnerable.  Usually when we refer to
a person as vulnerable we mean vulnerable to harm.2  A person or
group who is invulnerable, of course, cannot be harmed.3
In privacy, and elsewhere, the law often conceives of vulnerability
as the product of a status or a special relationship.  A person with
particular characteristics—for instance, a very young or old person—
may be vulnerable to various harms and hence require greater protec-
tion.  Privacy law reflects this view where, for instance, it protects chil-
dren’s privacy online but withdraws that protection at the age of
thirteen.4  In criminal law, the same action directed at a vulnerable
victim may result in higher penalties under sentencing guidelines.5
Additionally, most cases of “undue influence” involve victims who are
elderly or otherwise lack capacity.6
The law also sees vulnerabilities in certain relationships between
people.  In the context of privacy, Jack Balkin has explored the idea
that custodians of sensitive consumer information should be consid-
ered “information fiduciaries,” complete with obligations of loyalty
2. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EM-
ORY L.J. 251, 256–57 (2010) (explaining how the vulnerability approach employs an affirmative
duty for the government to ensure equality meaning citizens are provided equal access to socie-
tal goods).
3. Perhaps they are not even a person.  As philosopher Martha Nussbaum argues, a capacity
to be vulnerable is in some sense critical to the human condition.  On her account, a person who
is entirely hardened against society and incapable of trust essentially ceases to be human. See
generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK
TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY (1986).
4. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012).
5. E.g., Sentence of Imprisonment for Offenses Against Children, Elder Persons, or Handi-
capped Persons, HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-660.2 (2016) (imposing mandatory minimum sentences
without parole).
6. For a full, though skeptical, discussion of undue influence in the probate context, see gener-
ally Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571 (1997).
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and care.7  A more narrow relationship is generally necessary to trig-
ger these obligations.  We understand subjects in an experiment to be
vulnerable to the researcher and hence require special protections
throughout and beyond the study.  We also think of patients as vulner-
able to doctors and lay clients as vulnerable to financial advisors.
This binary conception of vulnerability as either present or absent is
hardly inevitable.  We can imagine a more nuanced understanding
that takes into account circumstance.8  The legal literature is indeed
replete with more nuanced discussions of vulnerability.  For example,
work by Florencia Luna conceives of vulnerability not as a label that
applies or does not apply but as a layer of personhood.  Thus, for
Luna, the proper way to understand vulnerability “is not by thinking
that someone is vulnerable, but by considering a particular situation
that makes or renders someone vulnerable.”9
The insight that vulnerability is not binary is critical.  Several in-
sights follow.  The first is that no one is entirely invulnerable at all
times and in all contexts.  We are all vulnerable in degrees and accord-
ing to circumstance.
Some theorists—notably Martha Fineman—would leverage our
shared human condition of vulnerability to supplant discrimination as
a way to organize equality discourse and redress.10  The responsibility
of the state becomes the recognition and redress of vulnerability as it
arises in society according to social, physical, environmental, or other
forces.  At the same time, although everyone is vulnerable to a degree,
some individuals and groups within society are more vulnerable than
others.  A person of color may lack privileges as basic as the benefit of
doubt, which in turn renders him or her systematically vulnerable to
7. See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1183, 1186, 1205–09 (2016).  Woodrow Hartzog and Neil Richards have explored related
concepts such as a greater role for confidentiality in digital privacy and, more recently, the im-
portance of promoting trust between firms and consumers. See generally Neil M. Richards &
Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431 (2016).
8. For example, the Supreme Court for a time recognized the need for special protections
from attorney solicitation while a person was recovering from injuries. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 464–68 (1978).
9. See Florencia Luna, Elucidating the Concept of Vulnerability: Layers Not Labels, INT’L J.
FEMINIST APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS, Spring 2009, at 121, 129.
10. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an Antidiscrimination
Approach to Equity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1752 (2012) (“The vulnerability and the human con-
dition thesis presents a foundation for the argument that there is a state responsibility to monitor
the promises of equality of access.”); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the
Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 268 (2010) (explaining how society and government institu-
tions can address “negative economic and institutional harms” experienced by vulnerable indi-
viduals in “certain societal positions” or those who “have suffered discrimination” through law
and policy).
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abuses of government power.11  Scholars have critiqued vulnerability
theory on this basis.12
The second insight is that vulnerability is not entirely a product of
happenstance.  The circumstances that correlate to vulnerability can
be controlled or engineered and, thus, so can vulnerability itself.  Vul-
nerability is not, or at least not exclusively, a naturally occurring phe-
nomenon.  A person, group, or society could exploit the vulnerability
it happens to come across in the world—as when an unscrupulous
caretaker exploits the vulnerability of an elderly charge in an effort to
divert her will.  But, separate and apart, a person, group, or society
could render a person more vulnerable by exposing that person to par-
ticular circumstances, actions, or information.  Tal Zarsky furnishes
the example of a consumer who receives a complementary pack of
cigarettes when the store figures out he is contemplating quitting.13
Again, this choice to exploit or render may in turn fall disproportion-
ately across society on the basis of demographic or other factors.  The
remainder of the Article explores these two insights in greater depth.
III. PRIVACY AS A SHIELD
Lex Luthor, the great enemy of Superman, was originally depicted
as a mad scientist with access to futuristic weaponry; however, by the
time of Gene Hackman’s famous portrayal in the 1978 film Superman,
Luthor was just a very clever businessperson.14  He is nevertheless
able to capture and almost kill Superman, who escapes only when
Luthor’s girlfriend frees him in order to save her family.  How does an
ordinary person like Luthor nearly defeat the Man of Steel?
Knowledge about a person confers power over that person.  It
makes the person vulnerable.  A straightforward example is physical
vulnerability: If you know that a person is allergic to peanuts (or
kryptonite) you could use that information to make them very sick.
Absent this knowledge you have no such power.
11. Cf. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1713 (1993) (discuss-
ing the “set of assumptions, privileges, and benefits” that accompany being a white individual).
Thank you to conference participant Paul Ohm for suggesting the need to expand this section.
12. E.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, Always Already Suspect: Revising Vulnerability Theory, 93 N.C.
L. REV. 1339, 1342 n.9 (2015) (critiquing vulnerability theory for its refusal to acknowledge the
role of identity); Nancy E. Dowd, Unfinished Equality: The Case of Black Boys, 2 IND. J.L. &
SOC. EQUALITY 36, 36–43 (2013).
13. Tal Z. Zarsky, Mine Your Own Business! Making the Case for the Implications of Data
Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 2, 20
(2002).
14. See SUPERMAN (Warner Bros. 1978).
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Whether knowledge creates vulnerability can depend on context.
Generally, there is no threat to person A if person B knows her loca-
tion.  Unless, of course, person B is the perpetrator of intimate part-
ner violence against person A.  That is why mapping services like
Google Maps, which make the world more discoverable, work with
domestic violence groups to help ensure information about certain
groups do not appear in the database.15
A second, related vulnerability is the prospect of blackmail.  The
FBI famously sought to blackmail Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. by
threatening to reveal alleged extramarital affairs, evidenced through
(illegal) wiretaps.16  One need not rely on this extreme, historic exam-
ple regarding a highly visible individual.  Paul Ohm speculates that
nearly everyone has a fact about them that could be ruinous were it
widely shared—what Ohm calls a “database of ruin.”17  If that is in-
deed true, this opens each of us to the prospect of being made vulner-
able through its discovery.
A third example involves persuasion.  In his chilling book Lexicon,
Max Barry dreams up a world in which Poets learn to overcome a
subject’s will through a particular string of words that break down the
mind’s resistance.18  Each person’s string is different in accordance to
their segment (i.e., their particular psychological category).  A skilled
Poet need only determine a person’s segment in order to completely
overtake them.  Poets themselves take great care not to reveal any-
thing about themselves—for instance, by selecting office de´cor at
random.
Lexicon is science fiction,19 but the notion that understanding a per-
son can lead to control over them is not.  In previous work, I explored
a different manner in which information about a person renders them
vulnerable.  Behavioral economics studies show that people do not al-
ways act rationally in their self-interest.  Indeed, people often behave
irrationally in largely predictable ways due to so-called cognitive bi-
ases.  Presumably, not everyone has the same cognitive biases or to
15. Ryan Singel, Google Map Makers Reaches Out to Anti-Domestic Violence Community,
WIRED (May 29, 2007, 4:55 PM), https://www.wired.com/2007/05/google_map_make/.
16. For a discussion, see Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1934, 1953–55 (2013).
17. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1748 (2010).
18. See generally MAX BARRY, LEXICON: A NOVEL (2013).
19. Mostly.  There is a relatively new branch of study that examines how better to persuade
consumers and others by determining their psychological make up.  It is called persuasion profil-
ing. See, e.g., Maurits Kaptein & Dean Eckles, Heterogeneity in the Effects of Online Persuasion,
J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING, Aug. 2012, at 176, 177.
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the same degrees.  Thus, a firm (company) with access to how a partic-
ular consumer deviates from rational decision making has both the
incentive and the means to extract rent from that consumer by
manipulating the circumstances of their interaction—what I call digi-
tal market manipulation after the work of Jon Hanson and Douglas
Kysar.20
Privacy acts as a shield in these and other contexts by placing barri-
ers in the way of discovering or rendering vulnerability.  Precisely how
Lex Luthor discovered Superman’s susceptibility to kryptonite is un-
clear, but presumably Superman could have used better information
security practices.  Location privacy lends greater physical security for
a significant portion of the population.  Information privacy keeps our
databases of ruin out of the hands of those who would exploit us.  A
stronger consumer privacy regime would make it more difficult for
firms and others to discover and hence exploit our cognitive biases.21
At a basic level, then, one function of privacy is to minimize the
exploitation and rendering of vulnerability by hiding the vulnerability
itself (e.g., location or peanut allergy) or by protecting the information
that, if known, would render us vulnerable in the moment.
As noted above, vulnerability is not distributed evenly across soci-
ety.  On the one hand, certain consumers—those with more resources,
for instance, or with cultural influence—might find themselves more
often targeted by certain advertisers.  On the other hand, factors such
as race or socioeconomic status can render people more vulnerable in
more contexts.  There is substantial evidence that the more vulnerable
a person is in society, the greater the societal expectation that they
shed privacy.  Work by Khiara Bridges, for example, illustrates the
extent to which “the poor barter their privacy rights in exchange for
government assistance.”22  While an insured mother expects privacy
20. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1000 (2014) (citing
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 747 (1999)).
21. Or we may wind up turning this information over voluntarily. See Scott R. Peppet, Unrav-
eling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of Full-Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L.
REV. 1153, 1154–56 (2011) (claiming individuals may disclose their personal information for eco-
nomic gain).
22. Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113, 173
(2011).  Michele Goodwin’s contribution to this very symposium also highlights the degree to
which debt collection in the health context falls disproportionately on the already disadvantaged.
Michele Goodwin, Hospital Snitches: Debt Collection and Corporate Responsibility, Address at
the DePaul University College of Law 22nd Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social
Policy: Privacy, Data Theft and Corporate Responsibility (Apr. 28, 2016).  Thank you to confer-
ence participant Danielle Keats Citron for pointing me toward Bridges’ research.
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around her prenatal care, a mother requiring public assistance must
answer a barrage of highly personal questions.23
Bridges’ observation arises in the context public health services;
other examples include welfare, employment, and criminal justice.24
A commonality among these contexts is that the more information
you have about a person or group, the greater the potential to take
advantage of them.  The fewer advantages a person or group already
enjoys, the lesser their ability to resist expectations and requirements
of turning over information in exchange for support.  The result is a
vicious cycle which bears great exploration and may militate in favor
of stronger privacy protections for the chronically vulnerable.
IV. PRIVACY AS A SWORD
Thus far, the discussion has suggested that greater vulnerability re-
sults from an absence of privacy or that privacy’s protections are de-
nied to the vulnerable; however, privacy bears an even darker relation
to vulnerability.  Privacy can hide the creation and exploitation of vul-
nerability itself—both literally and figuratively.
As previously mentioned, firms might use what they know about
consumers to take advantage of them, but firms also invoke privacy
even as they compromise it.  Many companies cling to trade secret
protection and other laws to avoid describing the processes by which
they study and sort consumers at a granular level.25  The digital envi-
ronments a company engineers—its websites and apps—are not trans-
parent to the user and attempts to reverse engineer this code can be
met with a lawsuit.26
Terms of service appear to be written purposefully to maximize al-
lowances while minimizing technical description.  Thus, a company
might say that it uses consumer information to provide services, in-
cluding advertising, without conveying any real information on how
23. See Ryan Calo, Privacy and Markets: A Love Story, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 679–81
(2015) (arguing that the market mechanism is at least theoretically more privacy friendly than
social distribution).
24. See Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV.
1389, 1390–93 (2012).
25. Nor is this practice limited to the private sector. See David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unac-
countability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 137–39 (2007) (dis-
cussing the refusal to disclose information relating to the internal workings of voting machines).
26. The most common arguments involve the anti-circumvention provision of the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act and, as in the recent decision in the Ninth Circuit, the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act prohibition on unauthorized access to a protected computer. See Facebook, Inc.
v. Power Ventures, Inc., 828 F.3d 1068, 1072, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2016).
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this occurs.27  When companies talk about how a service works, regu-
lators without technical expertise must largely take the firm at its
word.  Recent developments have seen improvements, however, both
in the degree of corporate transparency and in the technical capacity
of regulatory bodies to scrutinize information systems.28
The idea that privacy can be invoked as a shield against accountabil-
ity for vulnerability rendering and exploitation is neither limited to
the technology context nor particularly novel.  Feminist legal scholars
such as Catherine MacKinnon and Reva Siegel have long argued that
privacy exists in large measure to protect the spaces and practices by
which women are subjugated.29  MacKinnon argues that privacy is
foremost a right of the powerful to be left alone by the state—a free-
dom the powerful use largely to oppress the vulnerable.30  This idea,
while contested, is clearly true to a degree: Great harm happens be-
hind closed doors.31
Privacy is also deployed against the vulnerable at the level of rheto-
ric.  Recently we have seen the notion of privacy invoked rather ex-
plicitly to keep a vulnerable population vulnerable.  Specifically, at
least one state enacted a law that prohibits local municipalities from
establishing mixed gender bathrooms or permitting people to use the
bathroom consistent with their gender identity,32 and many other
27. M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1027, 1062 (2012).
28. The Federal Trade Commission in particular has actively recruited technologists to help
the Commission identify and redress digital harms. Privacy in the Digital Age: Preventing Data
Breaches and Combating Cybercrime: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong.
(2014) (prepared statement of Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FTC).
29. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in APPLICATIONS OF
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN’S LIVES: SEX, VIOLENCE, WORK, AND REPRODUCTION
985, 987–88 (D. Kelley Weisberg ed., 1996); Reva B. Seigel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2118–20, 2152–53 (1996) (discussing the right of
privacy of the family shielding prosecution of martial violence).
30. MacKinnon, supra note 29, at 991–92 (arguing privacy law doctrine is centered at the core R
of subjugation of women).
31. This is sometimes portrayed as a “radical” argument and, to the extent MacKinnon would
conceive of all of privacy as a mask for subjugation, it likely is.  But clearly there is truth to the
idea that vulnerability rendering and exploitation occurs behind privacy’s doors.  For an argu-
ment that privacy and the subjugation of women are not inexorably linked, see generally An-
nabelle Lever, Must Privacy and Sexual Equality Conflict? A Philosophical Examination and
Some Legal Evidence, 67 SOC. RES. 1137 (2000).
32. See, e.g., Public Facilities Privacy and Security Act, H.B. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2d Extra
Sess. (N.C. 2016) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-521.2, 143.760 (2016)), repealed by Pre-
emption of Regulation of Access to Multiple Occupancy Restrooms, H.B. 142, 2017 Gen. As-
semb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017); An Act to Restrict Access to Certain Restrooms and Locker
Rooms in Public Schools, H.B. 1008, 91st Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2016) (vetoed by Gov-
ernor, Mar. 2, 2016).
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states have introduced and considered similar legislation.33  One such
law—called the Public Facilities Privacy and Security Act—requires
people to use the bathroom corresponding to the gender on their birth
certificate.34
These laws reflect back the moral outrage experienced by members
of these communities against transgender people.  They are about
withdrawing protection.  But privacy is the way these laws have been
formally and publicly justified.  The idea is that it violates a person’s
privacy to be in the same bathroom as someone they conceive of the
opposite gender, even if that person’s own experience of their gender
differs, and even in places—like women’s bathrooms—that consist en-
tirely of stalls with doors.
Note the dual sense in which this privacy rationale enforces vulnera-
bility.  First, the target population is already vulnerable (in the classic
legal sense grounded in status or relationship) insofar as individuals’
gender identity differs from mainstream expectation.35  Second, the
context of the bathroom is one in which everyone—of any gender
identity—experiences vulnerability.  That is why the privacy rationale
gets so much traction and, at the same time, exactly why the violence
to the vulnerable target population is particularly intense.36
Finally, privacy can obscure the very concept of vulnerability.  I
have argued that there is a cost to attaching the label “privacy” to
context where the real harm at issue may involve vulnerability.37
Thus, for example, Griswold v. Connecticut38 famously invoked pri-
vacy (between a doctor and a patient) to place limits on the state’s
33. See, e.g., Alabama Privacy Act, S.B. 1, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2017) (referred to S.
Comm. on Judiciary); Student Physical Privacy Act, H.F. 41, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2017);
H.B. 202, 99th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Mo. 2017); Physical Privacy Act, H.B. 1612, 2017 Leg.
Sess. (Va. 2017); Child Privacy Act, H.B. 4474, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2016) (re-
ferred to the Rules Committee); Student Physical Privacy Act, S.B. 513, 2016 Leg. Sess. (Kan.
2016); Student Physical Privacy Act, H.B. 2737, 2016 Leg. Sess. (Kan. 2016); H.B. 1847, 98th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2016).  For an overview of introduced legislation regarding the
regulation of bathroom access, see generally Joellen Kralik, “Bathroom Bill” Legislative Track-
ing, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-
bathroom-bill-legislative-tracking635951130.aspx#2.
34. Public Facilities Privacy and Security Act, H.B. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2d Extra Sess.
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-521.2, 143.760 (2016)).
35. Alternatively, the individual may be in the presumably vulnerable position of exploring
the exact contours of gender identity.
36. Note the parallel to vulnerability theory and its critiques by identity theorists. See supra
notes 2–12 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the two theories, see Dowd, supra note R
12, at 36–45. R
37. M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1132–33, 1153 (2011)
(explaining how privacy harms result from the use, rather than the mere possession, of personal
information).
38. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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ability to control contraceptive use.39 Stanley v. Georgia40 invoked
privacy to push back against government censorship of obscenity,41
and Lawrence v. Texas42 invoked privacy again to explain why the
state cannot prohibit sodomy.43
Arguably, the values at issue in these cases deal less with privacy
than with equality or autonomy.  Further, we might wonder whether
characterizing the issue as privacy cabins the import of these decisions
to private spaces.  The statement “women should be able to make de-
cisions about their own bodies” or “men should be able to have sex
with other men” differs qualitatively from the claim that doctor’s of-
fices or bedrooms are private spaces in which the state should not
operate.44
V. PRIVACY AS AFFORDANCE
To summarize the argument so far: The law tends to think of vulner-
ability as either a status held by a person or group or as a relationship
between people or institutions.  As the legal literature increasingly
recognizes, vulnerability is best understood as layer of personhood—a
state that exists more often and to greater degrees in certain people
and contexts, perhaps, but exists in everyone sometimes.  Moreover,
vulnerability is not a naturally occurring phenomenon; it is con-
structed.  Personal information, and therefore privacy, plays a crucial
role in both rendering and exploiting vulnerability.
Privacy intersects vulnerability in a variety of complex ways.  For
example, people or groups without privacy are vulnerable and people
who are vulnerable have fewer opportunities to keep information
close.  Privacy can help interrupt information asymmetries that permit
firms and others to discover and exploit the ways individuals and
groups appear to be vulnerable.  At the same time, privacy facilitates
vulnerability rendering and exploitation by literally hiding abusive
practice, rhetorically serving as a weapon to justify oppression of the
39. Id. at 484–86.
40. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
41. Id. at 564–65, 568.
42. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
43. Id. at 578.
44. A possible counterargument says that privacy acts a bridge to greater tolerance of the
underlying conduct.  Thus, start by saying that men can have sex in their own bedrooms without
state intervention only to later invoke this precedent to strike down a ban on gay marriage.  This
process may be more comfortable; the question is whether it is necessary.  Real people suffered
in the years between Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015).
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vulnerable, and figuratively by obscuring the real value at issue in a
vulnerability context.
One final question: Given this complex, sometimes contradictory
relationship between privacy and vulnerability, how should privacy
scholarship approach it?  Other legal scholars have taken different ap-
proaches to privacy, but the dawning realization that privacy is ulti-
mately about power—in myriad forms and ways—has led me to seek
a new framework of analysis.45  Such a framework should recognize
the role privacy plays in compromising and protecting privacy for indi-
viduals, groups, and institutions.  It should be capable of bridging the
various senses of privacy as well as the many contexts—private and
public, digital and physical—in which privacy arises.  Crucially, it
should account for how the very experience and perception of privacy
as a sword or a shield varies across the population.
The framework I find most helpful is that of affordance theory.  Af-
fordance theory originates in James Gibson’s work in perceptual psy-
chology.46  Gibson notes that living creatures, including humans, share
the same environment.  However, they perceive it differently in accor-
dance to their own “affordances” (i.e., their capabilities and limita-
tions).  Thus, a bird perceives a cliff as irrelevant whereas a person
perceives it as dangerous.  A tree affords hiding to a squirrel but not
to a bear.  Gibson invokes the concept of affordances to bridge the
divide between the physical properties of the world (e.g., stairs and air
currents) and the relational properties they afford to particular orga-
nisms (e.g., climbing and flight).
Of particular interest to law and the social sciences is the notion,
mentioned by Gibson in passing, that people represent affordances to
one another.  “The richest and most elaborate affordances of the envi-
ronment,” writes Gibson, “are provided by other animals and, for us,
other people.”47  Many factors—social, physical, technical, cultural—
mediate these affordances.  I want to focus here on two.  The first is
the role of information.  A person is only an affordance if you are able
to perceive them as such.  Thus, for instance, you may require the as-
sistance of law enforcement and not realize that the plainclothes per-
son a few feet away is a police officer.  Gibson calls these unidentified
45. The realization has also led others to adopt new methods or justify existing methods in
new ways. See generally, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW,
CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012); NEIL M. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL
PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2015).
46. See generally, e.g., James J. Gibson, The Theory of Affordances, in Perceiving, Acting, and
Knowing: Toward an Ecological Psychology 67 (Robert Shaw & John Bransford eds., 1977).
47. Id. at 75.
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features of the environment “hidden” affordances.48  The second is
the role of law.  A trespasser might think your house affords him shel-
ter, a cannibal that your body affords him nutrition.  Property and
criminal law say otherwise.49
Privacy, too, can be conceptualized as an affordance.  Privacy fur-
nishes the capacity to withdraw from the world or to hide information
about oneself.  As with other features of an environment, what pri-
vacy affordances exist varies by personal capacity.  A cupboard may
afford physical concealment to a child but not an adult.  A famous
person cannot rely on the anonymity of the crowd.  The poor, being
reliant upon government and other services, realistically cannot “af-
ford” withdrawal or obscurity—which is why some talk of privacy as a
luxury good.50  People of color may draw greater scrutiny by the sur-
veillance state and hence have both a greater need for and lesser
chance to privacy’s affordances.51
Privacy as affordance also accommodates the complex role of pri-
vacy as both a shield and a sword for vulnerability.  Privacy can with-
draw information from others about our susceptibilities and help
protect against externally imposed conditions that trigger vulnerabil-
ity.  Privacy thus empowers the weak by placing limits on the strong.52
At the same time, privacy withdraws from public scrutiny—or, in
some cases, purports to justify—the manufacture and abuse of vulner-
ability.  Privacy thus empowers the strong by withdrawing abuses from
scrutiny.
Gibson’s theory of affordances could be usefully applied to the
study and development of privacy and privacy law.  Elsewhere I argue
that affordance theory helps interrogate whether American surveil-
lance law and policy has reached the proper equilibrium between pri-
vacy and national security.53  If the law affords citizens the means by
which to resist and reform surveillance, but citizens choose not to do
so, then a better case can be made that the state is adhering to a social
contract that permits a degree of surveillance in the interest of na-
48. Id. at 73.
49. Law creates, at minimum, a counter-affordance.
50. See Julia Angwin, Has Privacy Become a Luxury Good?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2014, A23.
51. For a recent and excellent discussion of the relationship between surveillance and race, see
Georgetown Law & Center on Privacy & Technology Conference, The Color of Surveillance:
Government Monitoring of the African American Community (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?407901-1/discussion-racial-bias-government.
52. Cf. Samuel L. Bray, Power Rules, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1172, 1174–76 (2010) (explaining
the various ways in which the law can protect vulnerable individuals, including harm, power-
decreasing, and power-increasing rules).
53. See Ryan Calo, Can Americans Resist Surveillance?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 23, 43 (2016).
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tional security.  In practice, Americans do not have such affordances,
which in turn calls the legitimacy of the surveillance state into doubt.
The most pressing set of problems in consumer privacy are at their
core similar: In the current environment, only firms possess meaning-
ful affordances.  Companies can collect data without asking, condition
interactions on the provision of other data, and in general under-
represent the utility of data to the firm and the corresponding danger
to the consumer.  Moreover, companies—having access to consumer
behavior and the ability to “code” the technical and legal environment
in which transactions take place—are able to shape the affordances of
the consumer to a far greater degree than consumers, individually or
collectively, can shape those of the firm.
Consumers appear to have choices that would permit them to pro-
tect themselves and police the market; however, as a range of scholars
have argued over the past decade, those choices are often illusory.
Consumers are vulnerable to firms but not the reverse.  This asymme-
try of information and power is ultimately unhealthy and unstainable.
The role of the policymaker, broadly understood, may be to help
restore balance in the set of respective affordances of consumers and
firms.  But, the argument I wish to advance here has to do with the
approach of privacy scholarship itself.  I believe the notion of techni-
cal, economic, and legal affordances can help structure and unify the
study of consumer privacy.  We can ask, within this framework, ques-
tions to determine whether a consumer perceives a set of privacy af-
fordances—including design choices (e.g., encryption), market
choices, and legal resources.  We can ask whether those perceptions
are true (i.e., whether the affordance is actual or “false”) and what
effects those perceptions have on consumer behavior.  We can also
examine whether the affordances vary according to demographics or
other factors in ways we consider problematic.  A complete account of
privacy as affordance is beyond the scope of this article.  It is, how-
ever, a promising means by which to explore not only the intersection
of vulnerability and privacy but privacy in general.
VI. CONCLUSION
Privacy is a concept that seems to lend itself to an instrumentalist
understanding.54  Privacy exists toward some, usually positive end in
society.  When it comes to the intersection between privacy and vul-
nerability, however, the picture is rather complex.  Privacy can be
both a shield against vulnerability and a sword in its service.  What is
54. See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 441–43, 446 (1980).
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needed to capture this complex interaction is a theoretical lens rooted
in the physical and social environment as it exists, but also sensitive to
the differing ways people perceive and experience that environment.
Although full throated defense of privacy as affordance is beyond the
scope of this Article, James Gibson’s theory is an interesting candidate
to capture this complexity.
